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Introduction 
Until the mid 1990s emerging Asia’s banking system
remained heavily regulated and barriers to foreign
competition were prohibitively high.However,in the
aftermath of the East Asian crisis of 1997–98, finan-
cial sector restructuring has been an essential element
of the structural adjustment programs in Indonesia,
Korea,Thailand and the Philippines.1 Broadly speak-
ing,governments in the crisis-hit regional economies
have attempted to restructure their financial systems
by closing down commercial banks and finance com-
panies, merging some existing institutions and na-
tionalizing others,injecting public funds to recapital-
ized viable banks, putting in place systematic asset
resolution strategies, as well as easing regulatory im-
pediments to foreign bank entry. Other countries in
the region, such as India and China, have also taken
steps towards financial deregulation. This paper ex-
amines the de jure and de facto policies towards for-
eign bank entry in selected emerging Asian
economies. For reasons of data availability, the focus
here is limited to China, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia,Thailand and the Philippines.2
De Jure openness of Asian banking systems 
One of the most immediate motivations for under-
taking this policy in most of the crisis-hit countries was
the much-needed funds that foreign investors brought
in to help recapitalize the banking systems. Beyond
the financing issues, however, it is becoming increas-
ingly apparent that foreign competition brings with it
additional benefits that may not be likely in the case
of domestic competition as elaborated elsewhere.3
Several Asian economies have witnessed crucial reg-
ulatory changes in their financial sector following the
Asian financial crisis of 1997–98.Most of the countries
have come up with specific blueprints for restructur-
ing their respective banking and financial sectors.
While the details of these reforms obviously vary be-
tween countries,one of the central elements of this re-
structuring plan common to all the countries has been
the move to ease the entry norms for foreign banks,
though the timing and pace has varied considerably.
Among the key regulatory changes that have taken
place pertaining to foreign bank entry was the amend-
ment of rules governing foreign equity limits in the do-
mestic banking sector.These were dramatically altered
in some of the hard-hit countries post crisis. While
countries like Indonesia, Korea and Thailand raised
their foreign ownership limits quite aggressively (al-
most to 100 percent with some caveats),others took a
far more gradualist approach. While the Philippines
allowed foreign banks to hold a 60 percent ownership
stake in local banks,India raised its limit on foreign eq-
uity ownership from 49 percent to 74 percent.
Malaysia seems to be the only country in the region
not to have relaxed its foreign equity limits,holding on
to its 30 percent or 49 percent limit depending on the
scope and type of business.China had a relatively low
ownership limit of 25 percent which is not surprising
because it started the process of opening up its bank-
ing sector only after its entry into the WTO in 2001.
The aggressive liberalizers: Indonesia, Korea,
Thailand and the Philippines
Indonesia, by virtue of being the hardest hit due to
the Asian crisis, was quite pro-active in undertaking
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within.full fledged restructuring of its financial sector fol-
lowing the crisis. The first step was to address the
problems in the domestic banking system,which was
done by setting up the Indonesian Bank Re-
structuring Agency (IBRA) in January 1998 to over-
see mass consolidations of the badly hit domestic
banks and also to address the issue of non-perform-
ing loans (NPLs) in state and private banks. In addi-
tion, the more significant regulatory change occured
when a new banking law came into existence in
November 1998 that relaxed the restrictions on for-
eign participation in the country’s domestic banking
industry.The key elements of that law included per-
mitting foreign banks to take over Indonesian banks
and invest in unlisted and listed banks, subject to
some restrictions,4 allowing foreign non-bank institu-
tions to purchase Indonesian banks and removing the
restrictions on the expansion of branches of foreign
joint-venture banks. This move also allowed the
IBRA to sell off the local banks that were national-
ized (in order to prevent them from completely col-
lapsing) during the crisis to the foreign firms. Due to
this “divestation”programme,the country has seen a
tremendous growth in the foreign ownership of the
national banking system.Foreign banks in Indonesia
constitute a sizeable presence in terms of their num-
ber. By the end of 2005, there were about 37 banks
that could be classified as foreign banks in Indonesia,
of which,11 were foreign bank branches,17 were joint
ventures and 9 were foreign acquired banks.This said,
the definition of a foreign bank does not include the
private national banks which have significant foreign
ownership stakes as well.
During the restructuring process post crisis, the
Korean government pursued a policy of encouraging
the entry of foreign banks and thereby easing all the
regulatory obstacles that stood in their way. In 1998,
the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was es-
tablished to oversee the financial sector restructuring
and the FSC recognized the need for foreign partici-
pation to assist the country in the process of recapi-
talization and enhance the efficiency of the banking
system. Foreign banks have also been allowed to es-
tablish subsidiaries in the country.Notwithstanding an
initial spurt in overseas foreign banks to the Korean
market immediately after the crisis, it was only post
2004 that the foreign bank entry through branches re-
sumed in a significant way, and by the end of 2008
there were 39 foreign bank branches in South Korea.
Thailand is the other aggressive liberalizer.The most
important regulatory reform following the 1997–98
crisis was to allow 100 percent foreign ownership of
the domestic financial institutions for a ten year pe-
riod,after which the foreign banks will not be able to
take up additional equity unless they hold less than
49 percent of the equity shares. This assumed more
prominence mainly because of the severe restrictions
that are in place for the foreign banks to gain market
access through establishing branches. The Financial
Sector Master Plan (FSMP) that was initiated in 2004
allows foreign banks to apply for two types of licens-
es.The first option is for a foreign bank to be a sub-
sidiary whereby it enjoys the same scope of business
as a commercial bank and is also allowed to open one
branch within Bangkok and three branches else-
where in Thailand.The second option is to apply for
a full branch of a foreign bank, which has the same
scope of business as a commercial bank but which is
not allowed to open any branches.The minimum cap-
ital requirement is higher for a branch than a sub-
sidiary.Foreign banks with majority shareholdings in
Thai commercial banks are also allowed (so-called
hybrid banks). Thailand had 3 hybrid banks, 16 for-
eign branch banks and 24 foreign banks that maintain
representative offices as of February 2009.
While the Philippines has not been nearly as aggres-
sive as the other three economies in terms of finan-
cial sector liberalization, its banking system too has
undergone substantial restructuring following the cri-
sis.Similar to its neighbours,in the year 2000,the gen-
eral banking act was amended to facilitate the entry
of foreign banks.This also resulted in a policy change
which encouraged significant cross-border mergers
and acquisitions in the financial sector.Foreign banks
were allowed to acquire a 100 percent stake till the
end of April 2007 after which the cap on ownership
reverted to 60 percent.
The cautious liberalizers: India and China5
The liberalization of financial services in India has
been gradually picking up since the early 1990s.
Foreign banks are now allowed to access the Indian
market not only through branches, but also as whol-
ly owned subsidiaries. This was a significant compo-
nent of the blueprint pertaining to widening the pres-
ence of foreign banks in the Indian market.6 Ag-
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gregate foreign investment limits in private domestic
banks (only those identified by the Reserve Bank of
India for restructuring) has been revised to 74 per-
cent. India’s regulatory environment is, in some cas-
es, more favorable to foreign banks than the domes-
tic banks,which is in contrast to most other countries
in the region.For instance,there is no discriminatory
treatment between a foreign bank and a domestic
bank as far as the banking operations are concerned.
A foreign bank can undertake all the activities open
to an Indian bank, including both retail as well as
wholesale banking business. In addition, there exists
some form of a positive discrimination favouring for-
eign banks as regards the priority sector lending re-
quirements.7
China has been a late entrant as far as opening up
its banking sector to foreign participation is con-
cerned. While most of the other Asian economies
undertook more aggressive domestic liberalization
than what they have offered under GATS, most of
the recent developments with respect to foreign
bank operations in China seem to have been pri-
marily driven by obligations arising from China’s
entry into the WTO in 2001. Though there was a
multilateral commitment for a phased expansion of
foreign bank access since end 2006,the penetration
level of foreign banks in China remains very small
and even insignificant to some extent as the larger
issue of complicated regulatory requirements still
remains. While the direct participation of foreign
banks as either branches or subsidiaries in the
Chinese banking system is insignificant, indirect
participation as investors with minority stakes has
been gaining considerable popularity in recent
years (Leigh and Podpiera 2006). Since 2003 the
maximum share a single foreign investor may take
in a local bank has been raised to 20 percent. The
overall maximum foreign shareholding is set at 25
percent. There were about 70 banks with minority
stakes in Chinese banks and close to 200 foreign
banks had opened up representative offices in
China as of end 2007.The regulations governing the
establishment of foreign banks remain quite strin-
gent compared to those of the other countries in the
region.
Significance of foreign banks in Asia
Overall, we see that much of Asia has taken impor-
tant – though but by no means uniform – steps in
opening up their banking systems to foreign compe-
tition. But to what extent have these regulatory
changes translated into actual tangible or de facto
changes? The evidence regarding the number and
share of foreign banks in the domestic economy is
somewhat counter-intiutive in that the number of for-
eign banks appear actually to have gone down in most
of the countries despite the various regulations de-
signed to ease the entry norms for foreign banks
(Table 1). However, this has largely been because of
major consolidations and domestic restructurings
among local banks.More noteworthy would be to ex-
amine the extent of market share of foreign banks in
terms of assets and liabilities.Table 2 offers some in-
dicative evidence by providing the extent of penetra-
tion of foreign banks with respect to their share of to-
tal assets and deposits.8
The levels of foreign bank penetration have increased
dramatically in Indonesia and Korea in particular,but
also in Thailand and the Philippines to a somewhat
lesser extent, especially in the case of foreign bank
share of domestic assets. Not surprisingly, the pene-
tration levels of foreign banks in China’s domestic
banking industry remained insignificant with just
about two to three percent share of total banking as-
sets at the end of 2007, though up from close to zero
in 1997.
India and Malaysia are interesting cases. As Table 2
indicates, there was no substantial change in market
share of foreign bank assets and deposits pre and post
7 Foreign banks are required to lend only 32 percent of net credit to
priority sectors, as against the 40 percent requirement for Indian
banks.Domestic banks also have a sub-ceiling in respect of agricul-
tural advances as a part of priority sector lending, which is not ap-
plicable to foreign banks.Export credits that are granted by foreign
banks would be adjusted towards the priority sector lending oblig-
ation, something not available for Indian banks.
8 The data for foreign bank assets are more easily available and
hence more complete (and probably more accurate) than that of
foreign bank deposits.
Table 1 
Number of foreign banks in emerging Asia






Indonesia 44  37  (2005)
Malaysia 14  13  (2008)
Thailand 21  16  (2008)
Philippines 13  22  (2008)
Korea 68  (1998)
3) 36  (2007)
China n.a. 71  (2007)
India 42  29  (2007)
Notes: In addition to branches and subsidiaries,
foreign banks here include minority stakes, joint
ventures, etc. Figures in parentheses denote the
latest available year for that country;
n.a. = not available.
Source: 1: Taken from Chua (2003). – 2: Compiled
from the EIU Country Finance Reports. – 3: Based 
on Oh and Park (1998).crisis in both these countries.In fact the shares of for-
eign bank deposits have actually declined in both the
countries, although marginally. This appears to be
largely because of a rapid rise in the presence of pri-
vate domestic commercial banks which have cap-
tured market share from national banks as well as
foreign banks.The share of foreign bank assets and
deposits in Malaysia have remained stable over the
last decade.While India’s regulatory policies seem to
provide a conducive environment for the entry and
operation of foreign banks, the significance of for-
eign banks in the domestic banking industry has ac-
tually been declining since 1997. The concomitant
rise in the private sector banks in the country and the
already existing state owned banks appear to be out-
pacing the foreign bank penetration rates. Spe-
cifically, the number of foreign banks operating in
India has actually declined from 42 during 1997–98
to about 29 in 2007. While this was partly due to
mergers between the Indian branches of foreign
banks, there were also closures of some foreign
banks in this period. As in Malaysia, domestic con-
solidations and privatizations were favoured over al-
lowing foreign bank entry per se.Thus, the share of
foreign bank assets in the total commercial banking
assets stood at nearly 8 percent in 2007, almost on
par with the levels during the 1997 financial crisis,
while that of deposits declined from about 7 percent
during 1997 to around 5.8 percent in 2008. On the
other hand, as discussed in Gopalan and Rajan
(2009), the significance of private sector banks has
been growing steadily since 1997 and they account-
ed for nearly 22 percent of the banking assets at the
end of 2007, up significantly from about 10 percent
in 1997. The same trend holds for deposits and the
shares of deposits held by the private banks expand-
ed signifcantly post crisis from about 8 percent to 20
percent in 2007.
Conclusion:Asia’s continued anxieties with
foreign bank entry
The evidence of efficiency and related gains to be had
from foreign bank entry are fairly strong. This has
motivated a number of emerging economies to wel-
come foreign banks into their domestic economy.
While Asian banking systems have become far more
internationalized over the last decade since the
1997–98 crisis,they still remain relatively closed com-
pared to their Eastern European and Latin American
counterparts.The relatively low penetration of banks
into Asia (measured in terms of loans, deposits or as-
sets) is consistent with the fact that while Asian
economies have been deregulating their banking sys-
tems for reasons noted above, they have approached
this process somewhat more cautiously than their
counterparts in Eastern European or Latin America
(for instance, see CGFS 2003). Part of this caution is
the belief in some quarters in Asia that foreign banks
might be a source of instability
and contagion rather than stabili-
ty. This appears to have been the
case in the recent global financial
crisis which hit Eastern Europe’s
financial system much harder than
it has the relatively more closed
and regulated Asian financial sys-
tem. Does foreign bank entry, or
more broadly,internationalization
of the financial sector, make the
country prone to international
capital booms and reversals and if
so,under what circumstances? The
evidence that a high share of for-
eign bank ownership may increase
the likelihood that foreign shocks
are transmitted domestically and
may thus be a source of added vul-
nerability is mixed at best. Much
more careful research needs to be
done on this topic.
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Table 2 
Share of bank assets and deposits in emerging Asia by foreign banks
with majority ownership (in %) 










4) 23 (2008) 21.1
4) 20.8
4) (2008)
Thailand 7.1 12.6 (2008) 2.9
4) 7.8
4) (2008)
Philippines 8.5 13.2 (2007) n.a. n.a.
Korea 2.2 15.7 (2008) 3.8
5) 10
5) (2002)
China 0.1 2.3 (2007) n.a. n.a.
India
6) 7.9 8.5 (2008) 7 5.8 (2008)
Note: A bank is defined as foreign if it includes over 50 percent of shares. 
Figures in parentheses denote the latest available year for that country.
n.a. = not available.
Source: 1: Unless otherwise mentioned, all the banking assets data for the
year 1997 is based on Cull and Peria (2007).
2: Unless otherwise mentioned, all the data available for 2007–08 is
based on EIU Country Finance Reports, latest available year.
3: Based on the following link: 
 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/
 2008/09/10/editorial-foreignowned-banks.html.
4: Data compiled from CEIC Global Database.
5: Data based on Kim and Lee (2004).
6: Data on India compiled from Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
documents; Prasad and Rao (2005).CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 33
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